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LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT LAW: A
MODEL FOR BALANCING A WOMAN'S
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS WITH A
PHARMACIST'S CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION
Abstract: In recent years, there have been several incidents where
pharmacists refused to dispense prescriptions for emergency contracep-
tion, as well as other types of contraceptives, because of their ethical,
moral, or religious beliefs. State law has attempted to address this prob-
lem in various ways, but frequently fails to balance adequately the rights
of a woman to access lawful contraceptive prescriptions against a phar-
macist's right to conscientiously object. This Note argues that pharma-
cist refusal laws should seek guidance from a similar conflict in the life-
sustaining treatment context. Life-sustaining treatment law permits a
health care provider to refuse to comply with a patient's decision re-
garding life-sustaining treatment, but imposes additional duties on the
health care provider who does so. These additional duties—requiring
the health care provider to notify the patient of its policy in advance
and transfer the patient to another health care facility—prevent both
the patient's and health care provider's rights from being compromised.
The Note concludes that analogous transfer and notice requirements
should be placed on pharmacists who conscientiously object to dispens-
ing contraceptive prescriptions.
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, a woman entered the pharmacy at a Kmart store in
Menomie, Wisconsin to refill her birth control prescription.' The only
pharmacist on duty refused to refill it because of his religious belicfs. 2
He also refused to transfer the prescription to a nearby pharmacy. 3 As
a result, the woman was forced to wait two days to receive her pre-
scription, exposing her to an increased risk of pregnancy. 4 Although
l Sarah Sturmon Dale, Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Dispense Birth Control?, TIME, June 7,
2004, at 22.
2 Id,
Id.
4 See id.; see also Kelsey C. Brodslto, Recent Developments, Patient Expectations and Access
to Presmiption Medication Are Threatened by Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, 7 MINN. J. L. Sct. &
815
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the Wisconsin Pharmacy Examining Board reprimanded the pharma-
cist, this was not an isolated incident—pharmacists have declined to
fill birth control prescriptions because of their ethical, moral, or relig-
ious beliefs in several other states. 5 There have been reports of similar
incidents in California, Washington, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Texas, New Hampshire, Ohio, and North Carolina.°
State legislation deals with this issue in various ways.? For exam-
ple, four states—Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Dakota—
have so-called "pharmacist refusal laws" explicitly allowing pharma-
cists to refuse to dispense contraceptive prescriptions because of their
religious, moral, or ethical beliefs.° Illinois, on the other hand, explic-
TEcti. 327, 331 (2005) (recounting the, Wisconsin incident); Ilully Teliska, Recent Devel-
opment, Obstacles to Access: flow Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine the Basic Health Care
Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 229, 229 (2005)
(same).
s See Amanda Paulson, Culture Wars Hit Local Pharmacy, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Apr. 8, 2005, at 1 (reporting several instances of pharmacists refusing to dispense contra-
ceptives and "morning-after" pills on moral or religious grounds); Kiinberlee Roth, Phar-
macists, Doctors Refuse to Dispense Pill on Moral Grounds, Ctn. Tam., Nov. 17, 2004, at Cl
(same); Rob Stein, Pharmacists' Rights at Front of New Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at
Al (sante). See generally In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Neil T. Noesen, No.
150310091PHM (Wis. Pharmacy Examining Bd. April 13, 2005), http://drl.wi.gov/dept/
decisions/docs/0405070.hun (reprimanding the pharmacist for failing to inform the
pharmacy of his refusal to transfer oral contraceptives to another pharmacy and requiring
him to notify future employers of his objection prior to providing pharmacy services).
6 See Paulson, supra note 5, at 1; Stein, supra note 5, at Al.
7 Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4) (West 2005) (exempting pharmacists as well
as doctors from being required to dispense contraceptive prescriptions when the refusal is
based on religious or conscientious objection), Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a), (b), -5(1)
(2005) (stating that no health care provider, including pharmacists, shall be required to
participate in a health care service that violates his or her conscience), S.D. CoolFiEn
LAws § 36-11-70 (2004) (declaring that no pharmacist will be required to dispense medi-
cation if there is reason to believe it will be used to cause an abortion), and GA. COMP•R. &
REDS. 480-5-.03(n) (2001) (stating that a pharmacist's refusal to fill a prescription based
upon ethical or moral beliefs will not be considered unprofessional conduct), with CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 733(b) (3) (West Supp. 2006) (allowing a pharmacist to refuse to
dispense a drug on religious, moral, or ethical grounds only if the pharmacist notifies his
or her employer beforehand in writing and only if protocols are in place to ensure that the
patient has timely access to the drug), and ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91 (2005) (re-
quiring a pharmacy to dispense valid prescriptions for contraceptives without delay, unless
the contraceptive is out of stock, in which case the pharmacy must provide an alternative
drug or transfer the prescription to another pharmacy).
8 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a), (b), -5(1); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70; C.A. COMP. R. & REDS. 480-5-.03(n). This Note will refer to laws
that allow health care providers generally, as opposed to pharmacists specifically, to refuse
to perform based on religious, moral, or ethical objections, as "health care provider refusal
laws."
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itly does not allow pharmacists to refuse to dispense contraception. 9
In 2005, in response to an incident in downtown Chicago where a
pharmacist at a drugstore refused to give emergency contraception to
two women, Governor Rod Blagojevich made permanent a temporary
order requiring Illinois pharmacies to dispense all prescriptions for
emergency contraception. 113 Under the law, any pharmacy in the state
that sells contraceptives approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Admini-
stration (the "FDA") must fill all contraceptive prescriptions," If the
contraceptive is not in stock, the pharmacy must provide an alterna-
tive drug, order the drug, or transfer the prescription to another local
pharmacy. 12
California also restricts a pharmacist's right to refuse to dispense
prescriptions to which he or she is ethically, morally, or religiously op-
posed.'s In order to refuse to dispense a prescription, the pharmacist
must first notify his or her employer in writing of the drugs that he or
she objects to dispensing." The pharmacist will then only be permit-
ted to refuse to dispense the prescription if the employer can rea-
sonably accommodate this refusal without creating undue hardship
on the employer. 15 The employer is also required to ensure that the
patient has timely access to the drug, despite the pharmacist's refusal
to dispense it."
Although the specific issue of a pharmacist's right to refuse to dis-
pense contraception is relatively new, the larger debate over whether a
health care provider can refuse to perform or provide services because
of moral or religious objections has swirled for years. 17 Most states have
9 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91.
1 ° See ILL. ADMIN CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91; John Chase, Legislators Back Edict on Birth Pills,
TRIE., Aug. 17, 2005, at 3; Paulson, supra note 5, at 1.
11 ILL. ADMIN CODE lit. 68, § 1330.91.
12 Id.
13 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 733(b) (3) (West Supp. 2006).
14 Id.
15 Id. (noting that "undue hardship" shall have the same meaning as applied to "undue
hardship" under subdivision (1) of section I2940 of California's Government Code). Sec-
tion 12940 cross-references to the definition of "undue hardship" in Section 12926. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 2005). Subsection (s) of section 12926 defines "undue hard-
ship" as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of
the financial resources of the facility involved, among other factors, CAL. GOV'• CODE
§ 12926(s) (West 2005).
16 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 733 ( b) (3) .
17 Adam Sonfield, Rights v. Responsibilities: Professional Standards and Provider Refusals,
GUTFMACHER REI''T ON Pun. PoL'v, Aug. 2005, at 7, 7, available at littp://www.guttmacher.
org/pubsitgr/08/3/gr080307.pdf (noting that the debate over the right of pharmacists to
refuse to dispense contraception is new but the larger issue of whether health care provid-
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laws dating back to the 1970s that explicitly allow doctors, nurses, or
health care institutions to refuse to provide or participate in certain
types of reproductive health care, such as abortion and contraceptive
services. 18 The debate continues, however, as to how far these health
care provider refusal laws should be expanded.'° Much of this debate
centers on pharmacists, who were not explicitly included in the early
refusal laws and are now insisting that they too have a right to conscien-
tiously object.2° This issue is especially pertinent because controversial
advances in medical technology, such as emergency contraception,
have met both with high demand from patients and moral objections
from health care providers. 21
This Note addresses pharmacists' right to conscientiously object
to dispensing contraception. Part I discusses the right of women to
access contraception and abortion services in the United States and
the limitations placed on those rights. 22 Part II addresses the history
of health care provider refusal laws, the factors contributing to the
expansion of refusal laws, and the application of these laws to life-
sustaining treatment decisions. 23 Part III focuses on efforts to expand
health care provider refusal laws to pharmacists and recent legislation
ers can refuse to perform services because of their religious convictions is not). This Note
uses "health care provider" as a general term to refer to any individual person, facility, or
organization involved in the health care field.
18 See, e.g, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4), (5) (West 2005); Coto. REV. STAT. § 25-6-
102(9) (2004); DEL. Com: ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West
2002); IOWA Cone ANN. § 146.1 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4)
(2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-337 (LexisNexis 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225
(2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40
(2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2B-4 (LexisNexis
2001); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101(d) (2005).
19 See, e.g., Adam Sonfield, New Refusal Clauses Shatter Balance Between Provider 'Con-
science,' Patient Needs, GUTTMACrIER REP'T ON Pun. POLY, Aug. 2004, at 1, 1-3 , available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/07/3/gr070301.pdf  (contending that more recent
movements to expand health care refusal laws, including such a movement by pharmacists,
threaten the balance between allowing for providers' conscientious objections and protect-
ing patients' access to health care services); Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Con-
science of Health Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177, 177 (1993) (arguing that current
health care refusal laws provide inadequate protection for health care providers with con-
scientious objections and proposing legislation expanding the right of health care provid-
ers to conscientiously object to performing or providing health care services).
2° See Pharmacists for Life International, Legal News and Information For Pro-Life
Pharmacists of Conscience, lutp://www.pfli.org/main.plip?pfli=legal  (last visited Mar. 24,
2006) [hereinafter Pharmacists for Life] (advocating for an expansion of conscience
clauses to pharmacists).
21 See Sonfield, .supra note 19, at 1.
22 See infra notes 28-74 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 75-190 and accompanying text.
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addressing this issue." Part IV discusses the inadequacies of current
pharmacist refusal laws, which fail to balance adequately a pharma-
cist's right to conscientiously object against a woman's right to access
contraception. 25 This Part then looks to life-sustaining treatment
court decisions and legislation to provide a model for balancing these
competing interests and concludes that current laws should include
transfer and notice requirements. 26 Although relevant, this Note will
not address possible First Amendment arguments based on the Free
Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause in relation to a pharma-
cist's right to conscientiously object. 27
24 See infra notes 191-235 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 236-250 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 251-283 and accompanying text. Several authors have explored as-
pects of pharmacist refusal laws, but have not utilized the approach that courts have taken
towards life-sustaining treatment options as a template for addressing the issue. See generally
Lorraine Schmall, Birth Control as a Labor Law Issue, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PUCY 139
(2006) (arguing that legal obstructions to birth control, such as health care provider re-
fusal laws, frustrate gender equality in the workplace and hence raise labor law issues);
Amy Bergquist, Note, Pharmacist Refusals: Dispensing (With) Religious Accommodation Under
Title VII, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1073 (2006) (analyzing pharmacist refusals under the religious
accommodation requirements of Title VII); Bryan A. Dykes, Note, Proposed Rights of Con-
science Legislation: Expanding to Include Pharmacists and Other Health Care Providers, 36 GA. L.
REV. 565 (2002) (proposing that state legislatures expand and strengthen health care pro-
vider refusal laws as applied to pharmacists and other health care providers so as to protect
the moral integrity and personal autonomy of health care providers); Minh N. Nguyen,
Comment, Refusal Clauses E.9' Pro-Life Pharmacists: How Can We Protect Ourselves from ThemT, 8
SCHOLAR 251 (2006) (discussing the effect of pharmacist refusal laws on women's repro-
ductive freedom, health, and rights); Teliska, supra note 4 (arguing that broad pharmacist
refusal laws will adversely affect low-income women arid rural women in particular).
27 In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the state's denial of unemployment compensation for employees who had
ingested illegal drugs—even though the employees had ingested the drug as part of a re-
ligious practice—because the law prohibiting the use of the drug was generally applicable.
492 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). The Court held that generally applicable laws that prohibit the
exercise of religion do not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at
878-79, M such, it is possible that the Constitution would nut require exemption fbr
pharmacists who religiously object to dispensing contraceptives from generally applicable
laws requiring contraceptive prescriptions to be filled. See id. Additionally, the Court noted
that religious accommodation and exemption should be left to the political process. Id. at
890. Moreover, a health care provider's conscientious objection may also be based on ethi-
cal or moral objections, rather than religious objections, in which case the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. would presumably not apply. See, e.g., Valley Hosp. Ass'n v.
Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2c1 963, 972 (Alaska 1997); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 632 (Mass. 1986); Dello v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516
N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (App. Div. 1987).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also recognized that the government may
accommodate religious practices without violating the Establishment Clause. Corp. of Pre-
siding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334
(1987). For example, in amp. of Presiding Bishop of Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints u
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I. HISTORY OF ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION
A. History of Access to Contraception
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized a right to be free from
governmental intrusion with regard to contraceptive use in Griswold v.
Connecticut in 1965.28 The statute at issue in Griswold made the use of
contraception illegal, as well as the assistance and counseling of that
use. 29 The Court held that a state could not prohibit contraceptive use
between married couples because such activity fell within a zone of
privacy guaranteed by the Constitution." This zone of privacy was a
penumbral right emanating from several fundamental constitutional
guarantees in various amendments, including the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 31
In particular, Griswold noted that contraceptive use was part of
the fundamental right of privacy surrounding the marital relation-
ship.32 While the Court acknowledged that other types of contracep-
tion regulation could be upheld (such as regulations regarding manu-
facture or sales), a regulation banning contraceptive use altogether
was unnecessarily broad and violated the fundamental right of mar-
ried couples to make a private decision to use contraceptives."
Amos, the Court held that a statutory exemption allowing religiously-affiliated organiza-
tions to be exempt from a generally applicable law prohibiting religious discrimination in
employment did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 334-40. Thus, it is plausible
that refusal clauses allowing for religious exemptions from performing or participating in
health services similarly do not violate the Establishment Clause. See id. Moreover, refusal
clauses also allow exemption for non-religious purposes, such as conscientious, moral, or
ethical objections, and thus would presumably not violate the Establishment Clause. See,
e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a) (West 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.633(3) (LexisNexis 2001); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a) , (b), -5(1) (2005). Addi-
tionally, some refusal clauses simply allow health care providers to refuse to participate in
health care services, without specifying the reason for the health care provider's objec-
tions. See, e.g., ALA. Coot § 22-8A-8(a) (LexisNexis 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601(a),
(b) (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181 (West 2001); see also Katherine A. White,
Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care Providers' Beliefs and Patients' Rights, 51
STAN. L. Rxv. 1703, 1724-33 (1999) (discussing Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
as applied to state regulations of religious health care providers).
28 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
2'3 Id. at 480.
") Id. at 485-86.
31 Id. at 484.
32 Id. at 485-86.
" Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
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In 1972, the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird extended the
right to use contraceptives to unmarried persons." A Massachusetts
law made it illegal to distribute contraceptives to unmarried persons,
while allowing distribution to married persons." While the Court
struck down the law as violating the Equal Protection Clause in treat-
ing married and unmarried persons differently, it also observed that
the right to privacy associated with using contraceptives is a funda-
mental right as wel1.36 In particular, the Court noted that the right to
privacy grants the individual freedom from governmental intrusion
into fundamentally personal decisions, such as whether to bear or be-
get a child. 37
In its 1977 decision in Carey Population Services International, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the reasoning and holdings of both Gris-
wold and Eisenstadt." In Carey, a New York statute not only prohibited
the distribution of contraceptives to anyone under the age of sixteen
and the advertisement or display of contraceptives, but also prohib-
ited anyone other than a licensed pharmacist from distributing con-
traceptives to persons sixteen or older." The Court again stated that
the decision to bear or beget a child is at the very heart of the choices
that are constitutionally protected by the right of privacy." The Court
then concluded that the statute's prohibitions on contraceptive use,
distribution, and advertisement were unconstitutional because they
did not serve any compelling state interests that justified burdening
such a fundamental right.'"
B. History of Access to Abortion
The Supreme Court extended the right of privacy to abortion in
1973, in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade.42 In Roe, the Court struck
down a statute that prohibited abortions except when necessary to
save the life of the mother. 43 The Court held that the fundamental
right to privacy rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
54 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).
55 Id. at 442.
6!f 	 at 453-55.
57 Id. at 453.
58 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
59 Id. at 681.
411 Id. at 685.
41 Id. at 690-91, 694-99, 701-02.
12 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
43 id., at 117-18, 166.
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Amendment was broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy." The Court also held that the state had
compelling interests in both the health of the mother and in the po-
tential life of the fetus.° These interests, however, became compelling
at various stages in the pregnancy, which the Court divided into three-
month periods called trimesters.° The state's interest in the health of
the mother was paramount during the first trimester; therefore, the
state could not regulate abortion during this period. 47 After the first
trimester, the interest in the potential life rose in importance and the
state could regulate abortion in ways that were reasonably related to
maternal health. 48 After the point of viability, which the Court placed
at the end of the second trimester, the state could choose to regulate
or even proscribe abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother.°
In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
the Supreme Court revisited the right to access an abortion in exam-
ining various requirements under a Pennsylvania abortion statute." In
so doing, the Court upheld the central holding of Roe, recognizing
the fundamental right of a woman to choose to have an abortion.51
The Court, however, rejected Roe's approach of balancing the compet-
ing interests in a pregnancy through a trimester framework. 52 Instead,
the Court held that state regulation of abortion is unconstitutional
when it places an undue burden on a woman's choice to have an
abortion." Thus, a state may regulate abortions to promote its inter-
est in potential life and the health of the mother at any point in the
pregnancy, so long as such regulation does not amount to an undue
44 Id. at 153.
45 Id. at 163-64.
45 Id. at 162-64.
47 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
45 Id.
49 Id.
55 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). The five provisions at issue in the Pennsylvania statute
were: (1) a requirement that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent
prior to the procedure; (2) a provision mandating informed consent of one parent for a
minor to obtain an abortion, but also providing for a judicial bypass procedure; (3) a re-
quirement that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion
must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband; (4) an exemption
from the foregoing requirements based upon a "medical emergency"; and (5) certain
reporting requirements for facilities providing abortion services. Id.
51 Id. at 871.
52 Id. at 873.
33 Id. at 874.
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burden on a woman's access to an abortion.54 The Court reaffirmed
that a state may choose to forbid abortions, but only after the point of
viability. 55 Additionally, even though a state may proscribe abortions
after viability, there must still be an exception to allow for an abortion
when necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother."
C. Limitations on the Federal Constitution Abortion Right
After the Supreme Court's decision in Roe holding that a woman
has a fundamental right to have an abortion, some lower courts in-
ferred that public hospitals, as state actors, could not refuse to per-
form elective abortions because such refusal violated a woman's con-
stitutional right to an abortion.57 For example, in Doe v. Hale Hospital,
a public hospital owned by the city of Haverhill, Massachusetts had a
policy of allowing therapeutic abortions, but forbidding elective abor-
tions, 58 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a
public medical facility may not forbid elective abortions so long as it
offers medically indistinguishable procedures, such as therapeutic
abortions." Likewise, in Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, the
Fourth Circuit held that Charleston Area Medical Center's policy of
prohibiting abortions except when necessary to save the life of the
mother conflicted with the holding in Roe, and thus was unconstitu-
tional 60
54 Id. at 878.
55 Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
" Id. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have reiterated this health exception require-
ment. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961, 967 (2000;
Stenherg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000).
57 See Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 529 F.2d 638, 643-45 (4th Cir. 1975); Doe v.
Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d 144, 147 (1st Cir. 1974). Because the Fourteenth Amendment osten-
sibly only applies to the states, as opposed to persons or private organizations, the Court's
rulings on abortion do not apply to a privately-funded hospital. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV; see also Hale Hosp., 500 F.2(1 at 147 (implying that a privately-funded hospital would
not be subject to Roe) . Under the concept of state action, however, an organization that
receives significant public funding or is heavily regulated by the slate may be required to
abide by the Constitution to the same degree as the state. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edi-
son Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (stating that there must be a "sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself"). The Court, however, has sharply
limited the degree to which even a public hospital is currently required to provide abor-
tions. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
55 500 2d. at 145.
59 Id. at 147.
00 Doe, 529 F.2d at 643-45.
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The Supreme Court, however, has since rejected the argument
that states are required either to provide elective abortions through
public facilities or to fund elective abortions through public funds.°
For example, in its 1977 decision in Maher V. Roe, the Court clarified
that Roe did not grant an unqualified right to an abortion from the
state; rather, it protected women from unduly burdensome interfer-
ence with a woman's freedom to choose to terminate a pregnancy. 62
Thus, a state could choose to favor a policy of childbirth over abortion
and implement that policy through the allocation of funds without
creating an unduly burdensome interference with a woman's right to
choose an abortion.° Women still had the option of using private
sources for abortion services.°
Additionally, in 1989, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the
Court held that nothing in the Constitution required states to enter
or remain in the abortion business or entitled private physicians and
patients to access public facilities for the performance of abortions.°
In Webster, a Missouri statute prohibited the use of public employees
and facilities to perform or assist in elective abortions 66 As in Maher,
the state's decision to use public facilities and staff to encourage
childbirth over abortion did not place an obstacle in the path of a
woman who chooses to have an abortion. 67 A woman could still
choose to have an abortion, the Court reasoned, even though she had
to rely on a privately employed physician to perform the procedure. 68
D. Broader Abortion Rights Under State Constitutions
Supreme Court decisions thus interpreted the federal Constitu-
tion as not requiring states to fund or provide abortion services. 69
Sonic state courts, however, have held that a state actor's denial of
abortion services or a state's refusal to fund abortion services violates
a woman's right to choose an abortion under their state constitu-
61 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1989); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
62 Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74. At issue was a Connecticut statute that limited state Medi-
caid benefits to abortions that were necessary to save the life of the mother. Id. at 466.
66 Id. at 473-74.
64 Id. at 474.
65 492 U.S. at 509-10.
66 Id. at 501.
fiz Id. at 509-10.
68 Id.
69 See Webster, 492 U.S. at 509-10; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
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tions.70 For example, in Valley Hospital Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coalition for
Choice, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a quasi-public hospital,
as a state actor, violated a woman's fundamental right to an abortion
found in Alaska's state constitution by refusing to perform elective
abortions. 71 By holding that a quasi-public institution was a state actor
subject to the limitations in the state constitution, the court necessar-
ily implied that a public hospital would be similarly subjected to con-
stitutional limitations as a state actor. 72
Additionally, in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, the
Supreme Court of California held that the state's refusal to fund elec-
tive abortions under Medi-Cal, California's Medicaid program, vio-
lated California's state constitution. 73 The court reasoned that al-
though the state had no constitutional obligation to pay for medical
care for the poor, once it decided to provide such benefits, it could
not withhold these benefits from otherwise qualified individuals sim-
ply because they chose to exercise their constitutional right to an
abortion. 74
II. HISTORY OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDER REFUSAL LAWS
A. Initial Wave of Health Care Provider Refusal Laws
Health care provider refusal laws initially appeared in the 1970s
as a general response to the constitutional requirements posed by the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade, and as a specific
response to a court's issuance of a preliminary injunction requiring a
Catholic hospital to perform a sterilization procedure. 75 On October
27, 1972, in Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Montana issued a preliminary injunction that required
a Catholic hospital—which was considered a state actor by virtue of
7° Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 971 (Alaska 1997);
Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 799 (Cal. 1981).
n 948 P.2d at 971.
72 See id. at 969-70.
a 625 P.2d at 798-99.
74 Id.
75 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp.
948, 950-51 (D. Mont. 1973), aff'd, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); see also ACLU REPRODUC-
TIVE FREEDOM PROJECT, ACLU, RELIGIOUS REFUSALS AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 1, 1
(2002), available at littp://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF911.pdf  [hereinafter ACLU
REPORT] (discussing the history of refusal clauses in the reproductive health context and
proposing a framework for reconciling the competing interests of health care providers'
conscientious objections and providing reproductive health care to patients).
826	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 47:815
receiving certain federal funds—to perform a sterilization procedure
on a woman. 76 Despite the fact that performing a sterilization proce-
dure was against the Catholic hospital's religious beliefs, the court
reasoned that, as a state actor, the hospital could not refuse to per-
form the sterilization without infringing a woman's constitutional
right to receive such services. 77
In June 1973, less than a year after the District of Montana's pre-
liminary injunction, Congress passed the Church Amendment." The
Church Amendment prevented health care entities that received cer-
tain federal funds and individuals employed by those entities from
being forced to perform certain reproductive services to which those
entities and their employees were morally or religiously opposed."
The Church Amendment opened the door for states to follow with
similar laws permitting health care providers to refuse to perform re-
productive services.8°
Current health care provider refusal laws reflect this initial focus
on allowing providers to refuse to perform reproductive services.81 As
such, most states have a health care provider refusal law referring
specifically to abortion procedures. 82 Some state laws simply declare
that a health care facility is not required to permit abortions within
76 See 369 F. Supp. at 950-51.
77 See id. at 950.
78 See Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91 (1973) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7
(2000)); Taylor, 369 F. Stipp. at 950.
79 Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91 (1973) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000) ).
8° See ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at I.
81 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4), (5) (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-
102 (9) (2004) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West
2002); IowA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4)
(2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-337 (LexisNexis 2003); OR. ItEv. STAT. § 435.225
(2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (West 2000); S.C. CODE, ANN. § 44-41-40
(2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68.34-104(5) (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2B-4 (LexisNexis
2001); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (d) (2005) .
82 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §18.16.010(b) (2004); Aitiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151
(2003); CAL. HEALTH &.SAFETY CODE § 123420(a)—(c) (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-6-104 (2004); 1DAII0 CODE ANN. § 18-612 (2004); KAN. STAT. Arm § 65-443 (2002);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1591, 1592 (2004); MICH. Cow,. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181
(West 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.032 (West 2004); NEB. Rev. STAT. §§ 28-337, 338; NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.475 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS L.Aw § 79-i (McKinney
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e), (f) (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West
2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485 (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-15-204 (2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6-2F-7 (LexisNexis 2001).
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the facility.83 In several states, however, only private or religiously-
affiliated health care facilities are permitted to decline to perform
abortions." Additionally, most states allow an individual person, em-
ployee, or health care provider to refuse to perform or participate in
abortion procedures. 86 A number of states also require that the per-
son who objects to performing or participating in the procedure ei-
ther advise the facility of his or her objection verbally or file a written
statement with the facility stating his or her objection.86
Some states also allow individual health care providers or facili-
ties to refuse to provide contraceptive services. 87 As with refusal laws
relating to abortion, some states limit the right to refuse to provide
contraceptive services to private institutions. 88 In contrast, some states
specifically permit state employees or facilities to refuse to provide
contraceptive services. 89
B. Lower Courts' Interpretation of Health Care Provider Refusal Laws
Lower courts have interpreted health care provider refusal
clauses in a variety of ways.° One court held that the constitutional
88 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §18.16.010(b); ARK. Coos ANN. § 20-16-601(b) (West 2005);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(b); Cow. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181; N.G. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-45.1(f); Or-HO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91(A), (B) (West 2004).
84 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(c); IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.2 (West
2005), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741(A); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-306(2) (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-105 (2005).
88 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151; ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (West 2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a); Cow. REv.
STAT. § 18.6-104; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791(a); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612; IOWA
CODE ANN. § 146.1; KAN. STAT. ANN § 65-443; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1591; Mo. REV.
STAT. § 197.032(1); N.Y. Qv. RIGHTS Law §794(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e); N.D.
CENT. CODE §23-16-14 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §1-741(13); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 435.485; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4441-40; Wvo. STAT.
MN . § 35-6-106 (2005).
86 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 123420(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6.104; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-41-40.
87 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4), (5) (West 2005); Cow. REV. STAT. § 25-6-
102(9) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903 (2004); OR. REv. STAT. § 435.225
(2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-211-4 (LexisNexis
2001); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101(d) (2005).
" See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102(9); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4);
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 68-34-104(5).
89 See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 435.225; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2B-4; WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-5-101 (d).
9° See, e.g., Valley liosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 971-72 (Alaska
1997); Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 244-45 (Ct. App.
1989); Kenny v. Ambulatory Ctr. of Miami, Fla., Inc., 400 So. 2d 1262, 1264-66 (Fla. Dist.
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right to an abortion trumps the health care provider's statutory right
to refusa1, 91 In Valley Hospital Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Alaska rejected a quasi-public hospital's
invocation of Alaska's refusal law, which provided that a hospital could
decline to offer abortions for reasons of moral conscience.92 The
court reasoned that it could not defer to the legislature when a statute
led to a violation of a woman's fundamental right to an abortion as
embodied in Alaska's constitution. 93 Thus, it held that the refusal law,
as applied to the quasi-public hospital in this case, was unconstitu-
tional."
Other courts have narrowly interpreted their health care pro-
vider refusal laws by limiting their application to certain individuals or
certain medicines.95 For instance, in Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Ma-
rina Hospital, a rape victim sought declaratory and injunctive relief
from a Catholic hospital for its failure to provide her with information
and access to emergency contraception as part of her treatment. 9°
The hospital claimed it was exempt from providing this treatment
under the state's Therapeutic Abortion Act, which allowed a religious
non-profit hospital to avoid liability for failing to perform or permit
the performance of an abortion on its premises. 97 The California
Court of Appeal concluded that since emergency contraception pre-
vents rather than terminates a pregnancy, the treatment was not con-
sidered an abortion under the meaning of the statute. 98
Ct. App. 1981); Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702, 709-10 (Mont. 1979);
Spellacy v. Tri-County Hosp., Equity No. 77-1788, 1978 WL 3437, at *3-4 (Pa. Ct. Com . Pl.
March 3, 1978).
91 See Valley Hosp. Ass'n, 948 P.2d at 971-72.
" Id.
93 Id. at 972.
94 Id.
95 See Brownfield, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45; Spellacy, 1978 WL 3437, at *3-4. The Spellacy
court, in an unreported case, chose to interpret refusal clauses narrowly so as not to allow
certain individuals not directly involved in providing the health care service to invoke it.
See 1978 WL 3437, at *3-4. In that case, au admissions clerk refused to admit patients en-
tering the hospital for abortions because of her religious beliefs. Id. at *1. The Court of
Common Pleas of Pennsylvania did not allow the clerk to invoke Pennsylvania's health care
provider refusal clause. Id. at *3-4. The court reasoned that the refusal clause only allowed
individuals directly involved in performing the abortion and whose services were essential
to the performance of the procedure to refuse to participate because of their religious
beliefs. Id. Because the clerk's duties were ancillary to the procedure and merely clerical,
she could not be exempted from her admissions duties. Id.
96 256 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
97 Id. at 244.
98 Id. at 245.
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Additionally, at least one court held that even if a health care
provider refusal law is written as an absolute, an employer may still
terminate an employee for refusing to perform a procedure if ac-
commodating his or her religious beliefs would create an undue
hardship on the employer.99 In Kenny v. Ambulatory Centre of Miami,
Florida, Inc., a nurse was demoted after she refused to participate in
abortion procedures.'" Although Florida's refusal law did not require
consideration of the hardship on the employer created by the em-
ployee's refusal to participate in certain services, the court adopted
the federal standard under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 19 '
This standard required the employer to reasonably accommodate the
employee's religious beliefs unless doing so would result in undue
hardship, 02 Because a reasonable accommodation of the nurse's be-
liefs would not have created an undue hardship on the hospital's abil-
ity to perform abortions, the nurse rightfully invoked the state's re-
fusal law and was wrongfully terminated.'"
By contrast, one court held that the language of its state health
care provider refusal law gave a hospital employee an unqualified
statutory right to refuse to participate in a medical service because of
moral objections.' 04 In Swanson V. St. John's Lutheran Hospital, a nurse
refused to participate in a sterilization procedure and was subse-
quently dismissed from her employment.'" Because the refusal law
did not consider the hardship a hospital might suffer as a result of an
employee's conscientious objection, the Supreme Court of Montana
in turn did not consider any hardship that might be suffered by the
hospital from the nurse's refusal.'"
C. Factors Contributing to the Expansion of Health
Care Provider Refusal Laws
Beginning in the 1990s, health care provider refusal laws at-
tracted renewed attention as a means to protect health care employ-
" See Kenny, 400 So. 2d at 1266.
100 Id. at 1263.
101 Id, at 1264-66.
102 Id. at 1266-67. The court noted that determining whether a good faith effort to
reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs had been made and whether the
employer had suffered undue hardship in his attempts to do so was a factual determina-
tion, to be made on a case-by-case basis. Id.
1" Id.
104 See Swanson, 597 P.2d at 710.
1 °5 Id. at 704-05.
106 Id. at 709-10.
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ees' conscientious objections to reproductive services. 147 State legisla-
tures expanded the types of procedures covered by these taws as well
as the number and types of providers who may invoke them.'" At least
three factors contributed to this renewed pressure: (1) the rise of re-
ligious health care systems, (2) the expansion of managed care, and
(3) the development of controversial medical technology.'"
First, religious health care systems have become more significant in
the health care provider market."° For example, as of September
2005, four of the top ten largest non-profit health care systems were
Catholic-owned, including the largest non-profit health care system.'"
Additionally, there are 611 Catholic hospitals in the United States,
representing approximately 12% of all hospitals nationwide." 2 Be-
cause of its ethical directives that prohibit or limit controversial serv-
ices such as contraceptive sterilization, in vitro fertilization, prescrip-
tion or dispensation of contraceptive devices, and abortions, the
prevalence of Catholic health care is significant." 3 Moreover, this im-
pact is intensified by the fact that over a quarter of the 611 Catholic
MACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 1; Son field, supra note 19, at 1.
108 ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 1; Sonfield, supra note 19, at 1.
109 See ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 1-3; CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, CATHOLIC
HEALTH CARE UPDATE; THE FACTS ABOUT CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE IN THE UNITED STATES 1-
6 (2005), available at littp://www.catholicsforchoicemg/topics/healthcare/documents/
2005factsaboutcatholichealthcare_000.pdf [hereinafter CATHOLIC HEALTH Cana Rachel
Benson Gold, Conscience Makes a Comeback in the Age of Managed Care, GUTTMACHER REP'T
ON Pun. POL'v, Feb. 1998, at 1, 1-2, available at http://www.guttniacher.org/pubs/tgr/
01/ I /grOl 0101 .pdf; Sonfield, supra note 19, at 1.
110 ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 1; CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at 1-6.
111 HEALTit CARE, supra note 109, at 1-2. This Note focuses mainly on
Catholic health care not only because of its size in the health care market, but also because
it places the greatest restrictions on reproductive health care services. See Susan Berke
Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe Is Not Enough: When Religion Controls Healthcare, 31
FORDHANI URB. L.J. 725, 732 (2004) (arguing that limits must be placed on corporate
health entities' ability to restrict access to health care services based on religious beliefs).
For example, the United Methodist Church recognizes a woman's right to an abortion.
Donald H.J. Hermann, Religious Identity and the Health Care Market: Mergers and Acquisitions
Involving Religiously Affiliated Providers, 34 CnEtoi [Tom L. REV. 927, 959 (2001) (analyzing
the health care market's integration of services and challenges faced when secular and
religious entities integrate). Also, the Presbyterian Church leaves the moral decision to
have an abortion in the hands of the woman, while noting that the decision to have an
abortion should be a last resort. Id. at 959-60. Additionally, Judaism is likewise not as re-
strictive as the Catholic Church regarding reproductive health care services. Id. at 959. For
example, Judaism welcomes the option of ill-vitro fertilization. Id. Jewish hospitals also do
not restrict medical services. Fogel Sc Rivera, supra, at 732.
112 CATiioLic HEALTH CARE, supra note 109, at I.
115 CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE:, supra note 109, at 2; see U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES
§§ 38, 39, 41, 45, 52, 53 (2001) [hereinafter ETHICAL DIRECTIVES].
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hospitals in the United States are located in rural arcas. 114 Thus, for a
woman located in a rural area, the only practically available hospital
may be Catholic; as such, her ability to access many reproductive serv-
ices may be severely limited. 115
Second, the rapid expansion of managed care has also contrib-
uted to the renewed interest in health care provider refusal laws be-
cause managed care plans restrict enrollees to a limited pool of health
care providers. 116 Traditionally, a patient could seek out alternative
providers if his or her primary provider refused to provide certain
services; fee-for-service insurance paid for any provider a patient
chose. 117 Managed care plans, however, only pay for services per-
formed by certain health care providers. 116 As a result, a patient may
be unable to obtain certain services if his or her primary providers
refuse to perform them and the patient is unable to afford an alter-
nate provider's services not covered by his or her managed care
plan. 119
Moreover, there has been marked growth in religiously affiliated
managed care organizations, which often object to paying for certain
reproductive services. 12° For example, as of September 2005, abortion
services were largely unavailable under Catholic HMOs. 121 In addi-
tion, only approximately one-half of Catholic HMOs cover contracep-
tion or sterilization services. 122 This is a significantly lower percentage
than the 93% of all HMOs that cover at least one form of contracep-
tion, and the 86% that cover sterilization services.'" As such, it is a
significant limitation for the nearly 2.5 million individuals covered by
Catholic managed care plans in the United States as of 2000. 124
Additionally, under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress
now allows Medicaid managed care organizations to refuse to cover
certain services based on religious or moral objections. 126 This statute
allows a Medicaid managed care organization to refrain from provid-
I " Cacritouc I-1r.A.mi CARE, supra note 109, at 1.
115 Sre id, at 1-2.
116 ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 2; Gold, supra note 109, at 1,
117 ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 2.
115 Id.; Gold, supra note 109, at I.
116 ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 2; Gold, supra note 109, at 1.
1 " ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 2; Gold, supra note 109, at 1.
121 CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE, SilPra note 109, at 4. An 1-IMO (health maintenance or-
ganization) is a type of managed care organization. See id.
In Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b) (3) (2000). .
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ing, reimbursing for, or providing coverage of a counseling or referral
service if the organization objects to the provision of such services on
moral or religious grounds. 126
In addition to the rise in religiously affiliated health care organi-
zations and managed care, the development and increased availability
of controversial medical technology has also contributed to the
movement towards expanding refusal laws.' 27 While most health care
provider refusal laws cover abortion, contraception, and sterilization,
the range of medical technologies to which health care providers are
morally or religiously opposed is broader than those services. 128 In
addition to abortion and sterilization services, objectionable technol-
ogy can include emergency contraception, in vitro fertilization, medi-
cal research involving human embryos or fetuses, withdrawal or with-
holding of life-sustaining treatment, and physician-assisted suicide. 129
D. Judicial and Legislative Response to Conflict Between Health Care
Providers and Patients' Life-Sustaining Reatment Decisions
Life-sustaining treatment in particular has generated consider-
able conflict between patients and health care providers who consci-
entiously object to complying with a patient's decision to forgo or
withdraw from such treatment.'" Life-sustaining treatment refers to
any treatment that serves to prolong life without reversing the under-
lying medical condition."' For example, a hospital may keep a patient
alive through the use of a respirator or ventilator because she cannot
breathe on her own.'" Additionally, a doctor may give a patient
artificial nutrition and hydration because he cannot eat or drink in-
dependently.'"
125 Id.
'27 ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 3; Sonfield, supra note 19, at 1.
128 ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 3; Sonfield, supra note 19, at 1.
129 ACLU REPORT, supra note 75, at 3; Sonfield, supra note 19, at I.
13° See, e.g., Cray v. Romeo, 697 F. Stipp. 580, 583 (D.R.I. 1988); Morrison V. Abramo-
vice, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532 (Ct. App. 1988); Bolivia v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304
(Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v. Super. Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222-23 (Ct. App. 1984); Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2c1 626, 632 (Mass. 1986); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434,
437 (N.J. 1987); In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886, 888-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), affd,
517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. CL Ch. Div. 1986); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc.,
544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (App. Div. 1989); Delia v. Westchester County Med. Gtr., 516
N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (App. Div. 1987).
131 A.m. MED. ASS'N, CODY: OF MED. ETHICS § 2.20 (2004).
1" See id.
153 See id.
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The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has been recognized
by both the judiciary and state legislatures as a broad fundamental
right.' 54 Courts have recognized this right as emanating from a variety
of sources. 13" For example, the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
has been affirmed as a corollary to the common-law right of informed
consent.'" It has also been recognized as rooted in the right to self-
determination and personal autonomy.' 37 Additionally, some state
courts have recognized that the right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment can be encompassed within the right to privacy in their respec-
tive state constitutionS. 138 Lastly, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health, the Supreme Court not only noted the various sources
to which the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has been attrib-
uted, but also affirmed that the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment was a liberty interest encompassed in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 39
States have also recognized the fundamental right to refuse
medical treatment in statutory terms.m For instance, Alabama law
declares that "competent adult persons have the right to control the
decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, includ-
ing, without limitation, the decision to have medical procedures ...
withheld, or withdrawn in instances of terminal conditions and per-
manent unconsciousness." 141 Similarly, Tennessee law states that
"every person has the fundamental and inherent right to die naturally
with as much dignity as circumstances permit and to accept, refuse,
154 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-2 (LexisNexis 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-102(a)
(2001); W VA. Coos ANN. § 16.30-2(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2001); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 584-86; Bouvia, 225 Cal, Rptr. at
300-04; Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25; Delio, 516 N.Y.S.2t1 at 685-86. Indeed, one com-
mentator has noted that the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has become a broad
"right of virtually any patient to refuse virtually any treatment." David Orentlicher, The
Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest Revolution, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 443, 465
(1997).
' 55 See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78; Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 584-86; Bouvier, 225 Cal.
Rptr. at 301; Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25; Delio, 516 N.Y.S.2c1 at 686.
1 " See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270; Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rini; at 301 (quoting Barber v. Su-
per. Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Ct. App. 1983)); Delia, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 685-86.
157 See, e.g., Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 586; Brophy, 497 N•E•2d at 633.
155 See, e.g., Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225; Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 633; In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 663 (NJ. 1976).
155 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78.
1" See, e.g., ALA. Coos § 22-8A-2 (LexisNexis 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-102(a)
(2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-2 (b) (1) (LexisNexis 2001).
14 ' ALA. CODE § 22-8A-2.
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withdraw from, or otherwise control decisions relating to the render-
ing of the person's own medical care. "142
Accordingly, all states allow a patient (or a surrogate decision
maker) to decide to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn or with-
held from the patient, even though such a decision may result in the
patient's death.'" Patients or their surrogates are authorized to make
such a decision by virtue of a state's advance directive statute.'" An
advance directive can take the form of a living will, drafted by the pa-
tient, which directs a health care provider as to which medical treat-
ment to provide or cease providing.'" Additionally, a patient may ap-
point a health care proxy or agent to make a health care decision for
him or her in the event the patient is incompetent.'"
Nevertheless, a patient's decision to withdraw or withhold life-
sustaining treatment can raise moral or ethical conflicts for a health
care provider." 7 For example, in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital,
Inc., both the patient's physician and the hospital believed that with-
drawing a feeding tube from a patient in a persistent vegetative state
would constitute a harmful act that deliberately produced death.'"
Similarly, in Delia v. Westchester County Medical Center, the hospital ob-
jected to withdrawing a feeding tube from a patient because it be-
142 TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-102(a). Additionally, the West Virginia legislature states
that "friottunon law tradition and the medical profession in general have traditionally
recognized the right of a capable adult to accept or reject medical or surgical intervention
affecting one's own medical condition." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-2(b) (1).
148 See, e.g., ALA. Cunt: § 22-8A-4 (LexisNexis 1997 & Supp. 2005); CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 4670, 4671(a) (West Supp. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-575, 576 (West 2003);
KV. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 311.623(1) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 2010, § 2 (West 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-120-2 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-
11-104(a) (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-30-4 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005).
1" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4; CAL. Piton. CODE §§ 4670, 4671(a); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-575, 576; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.623; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch .
2010, § 2; S.D. ContriED LAWS § 34-120-2; TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-104(a); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 16-30-4.
145 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-575; Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.623(1)(a), (h); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §34-120-2; TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-
104(a). •
146 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(b); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-576(a); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.623(1)(c); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 2010, § 2; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-
30-4.
142 See, e.g., Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 583; Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 532; Bouvia, 225 Cal.
Rptr. at 304; Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 632; _bites, 529 A.2d at 437; Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 843;
Dello, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
148 497 N.E.2d at 632.
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lieved that doing so would be contrary to its moral and ethical stan-
dards and its mission of preserving life. 149
Withdrawing from life-sustaining treatment may cause religious
concerns for a health care provider as well.'" For instance, the Ethical
and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services states that
there should be a presumption in favor of providing nutrition and
hydration to all patients, including patients who require medically
assisted nutrition and hydration, as long as this is of sufficient benefit
to outweigh the burdens involved to the patient. 151 Thus, a patient
may wish to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment, but if the
health care provider believes the benefits of treatment outweigh the
burdens to the patient, the health care provider may refuse to do so
on religious grounds. 152
1. Judicial Response to the Conflict Between a Patient's Request to
Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment and a Health Care Provider's
Conscientious Objection
Several court decisions have addressed the situation where a
health care provider conscientiously objects to a patient's request to
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. 15" Some courts at-
tempted to protect the patient's right to refuse treatment while still
accommodating the health care provider's conscientious objection by
requiring that the patient be transferred to another health care pro-
vider willing to carry out the patient's wishes to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment. 154
For example, in Brophy, the wife of a patient in a persistent vege-
tative state wished to have life-sustaining nutrition and hydration
withdrawn from the patient. 155 The patient's physicians as well as the
149 516 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
159 See e.g., Barging; 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223; Requena, 517 A.2d at 887-89; ETHICAL Di arc-
TIVES, MOM note 113, § 56-59.
151 ETtlicm. DIRECTIVES, supra note 113, § 58.
152 See id,
155 See, e.g., Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 583; Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 532; Bouvier, 225 Cal.
Rptr. at 298; Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221; Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 627; jobe.5, 529 A.2d at 437;
Requena, 517 A.2d at 887; Elbauni, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 842; Delio, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
154 See Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35; Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 639-40.
155 497 N.E.2d at 631-32. A person in a persistent vegitative state is unaware of his or
her surroundings and lacks cognitive abilities, but may still exhibit non-cognitive func-
tions, such as breathing, circulation, and spontaneous movements. See Nat'l Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Nat'l Inst. of Health, NINI)S Coma and Persistent
Vegetative State Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.govidisorders/coma/coma.htin
(last visited July 29, 2006). As the political firestorm surrounding the removal of Terri
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hospital refused to withdraw the feeding tube, believing that doing so
would constitute a harmful act which would deliberately produce
death. 156 The hospital, however, was not opposed to transferring the
patient to another facility willing to remove the feeding tube. 157 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reasoned that so long as the
patient's right to self-determination was not denied and the patient's
wishes were fulfilled at another facility, it was possible to preserve the
ethical integrity of the hospital and its staff. 158
More than one court has gone further to protect the patient's
right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment over the health care pro-
vider's objections by explicitly requiring the health care provider to
carry out the patient's wishes if a transfer was not possible. 159 For ex-
ample, in Gray u. Romeo, the family of a patient in a persistent vegeta-
tive state requested that the patient be removed from artificial nutri-
tion and hydration. 16° The hospital refused to comply with the request
because, as an institution, it was opposed to withdrawing nutrition
and hydration. 161 It equated the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration
with euthanasia.' 62 The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, however, while noting that it would be unsettling to the health
care professionals who opposed withdrawing the feeding tube, held
that the hospital had no choice but to acknowledge the patient's right
of self-cletermination. 163 As a result, if the patient could not be
promptly transferred to a health care facility willing to respect the pa-
tient's wishes, the hospital was obligated to comply with the patient's
requests. 164
Furthermore, at least one court has held that, even though trans-
ferring the patient to another facility was possible, the facility had to
comply with the patient's wishes to refuse artificial feeding. 165 In In re
Requena, a woman dying of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, which ren-
dered her unable to ingest food orally, refused to accept artificial nu-
Schiavo's feeding tube demonstrated, patients may spend decades in such a state and may
never recover. See Abby Goodnough, Schiavo Autopsy Says Brain, Withered, Was Untreatable,
N.Y. TrmEsJune 16, 2005, at Al.
156 Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 632.
167 Id.
158 Id. at 639.
159 See Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 591; lobes, 529 A.2d at 450; Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
16° 697 F. Supp. at 583.
161 Id.
162 Id.
1633 	 at 591.
164 Id.
165 See Requena, 517 A.2d at 889.
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trition and hydration.' 66 The hospital had a policy against withholding
or withdrawing food or fluids from patients and refused to comply
with the patient's wishes.' 67 It was, however, willing to assist in trans-
ferring the patient to another institution which would carry out the
patient's request) 68 Although transferring the patient was both medi-
cally and practically feasible, the Superior Court of New Jersey or-
dered the hospital to honor the patient's request. 169 The court stated
that it would be too emotionally and psychologically upsetting to
force the patient to leave the hospital.'"
In deciding whether to require the facility to comply with the pa-
tient's wishes, courts also sometimes consider whether the patient and
his or her family had notice of the facility's official policy regarding
life-sustaining treatment prior to or upon admission to the facility."'
Some courts have reasoned that, without prior notice of a health care
provider's policy regarding life-sustaining treatment, a patient is enti-
tled to presume that his or her right to refuse treatment would not be
hindered.'"
For instance, in In re Jobes, a nursing home refused on moral
grounds to comply with a patient's family's request to remove the pa-
tient from life-sustaining artificial nutrition and hydration)" The
nursing home, however, did not inform the patient's family of its pol-
icy regarding artificial feeding until the patient's family requested that
the feeding tube be rernoved. 174 Nor was there any indication that the
nursing home's policy against removing artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion was ever formalized)" The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted
that the patient's family had no notice that they were surrendering
the right to choose among medical alternatives when they placed the
patient in the nursing home.'" As a result, the court held that the
166 Id. at 887-88.
167 Id. at 888-89.
166 Id. at 889.
169 Id. at 890.
170 	 517 A.2d at 892-93.
171 See Gray, 697 F. Sapp. at 590-91; lobes, 529 A.2c1 at 450; Requena, 517 A.2d at 870; El-
baum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 847-48.
172 See Gray, 697 F. Sapp. at 590-91; lobes, 529 A.2d at 450; Requena, 517 A.2d at 870; El-
baum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 847-48.
17s 	 A.2d at 437.
174 Id. at 450.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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family was entitled to rely on the nursing home's apparent willingness
to defer to the family's choice of medical treatment for the patient.'"
2. Legislative Response to the Conflict Between a Patient's Wish to
Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment and a Health Care Provider's
Conscientious Objection
Most states allow a health care provider to refuse to comply with a
patient's life-sustaining treatment decision as contained within the
patient's advance directive if the health care provider opposes the
treatment decision the patient has made.' 78 Refusing to comply with
the patient's wishes, however, usually imposes additional duties on the
health care provider.I 79 These additional duties ensure that a patient
is not prevented from exercising his or her right to refuse medical
treatment, while still accommodating the health care provider's relig-
ious, moral, or ethical integrity. 180
For example, in most states, the physician or facility that objects
to honoring the patient's decision must aid the patient and his or her
family in transferring the patient to a physician or facility that will
carry out the decision. 18 ' Additionally, a few states address the situa-
tion that arises if a transfer cannot be arranged. 182 For instance, New
York and Massachusetts impose an additional duty: if a transfer can-
not be arranged, the health care provider must either seek judicial
177 Id.
178 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §22-8A-8(b) (LexisNexis 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4736 (West
Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.633(3) (LexisNexis 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 39-12D-11 (2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (2001).
179 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4736(a), (b); Cow. REV. STAT.
§ 15-14-507(1), (2) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a; FIA. STAT. ANN. § 765.1105
(West 2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65 (West 1996);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2984(3) , (4) (McKinney 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-11;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a).
180 See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a) (LexisNexis 1997); C01.0. REV. STAT. §15-14-507(1),
(2); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4736(a), (b); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.1105; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65; N.Y. Pun.
HEALTH LAW § 2984(3), (4); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-121)-11; TENN. CODE ANN. § 32- 11-
108(a).
set See, e.g., ALA. Cone § 22-8A-8(a); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4736(6); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-580a; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.1105; Ky. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(2); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-11; TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a).
182 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.1105(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-413 (LexisNexis
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,107(a) (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 20113, § 14
(West 2004); N.Y. Pue. HEALTH LAW § 2984(3) (b); R.I. GEN. Laws § 23-4.11-9(a) (2001);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(3) (1993).
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relief or honor the patient's or health care proxy's decision. 183 By con-
trast, Indiana laws declare that if an attending physician cannot find
another physician willing to carry out the patient's wishes to withdraw
or withhold life-sustaining treatment, the attending physician may re-
fuse to comply with the patient's wishes:184 Moreover, in Kansas,
Rhode Island, and Utah, failure to effect the transfer of the patient to
another facility constitutes unprofessional conduct. 185
Some states also require a health care facility to give notice to the
patient and his or her family, prior to or upon admission, of the facil-
ity's policy of refusing to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.'" In fact,
federal regulation has also imposed a notice requirement on health
care facilities that receive Medicare and Medicaid funding.' 87 In order
to refuse to comply with a patient's advance directive for reasons of
conscience, a health care facility must have clear and precisely written
policies explaining the facility's limitations. 188 The statement, at a mini-
mum, should (1) clarify differences between institution-wide con-
science objections and those that may be raised by individual physi-
cians, (2) identify the state legal authority permitting such objections,
and (3) describe the medical conditions that would be affected by these
objections. 189 This information must be given when an individual is
admitted to the facility. 18°
III. PHARMACIST REFUSAL LAWS
Refusal clauses have expanded not only to cover health care serv-
ices other than abortion and contraception, such as life-sustaining
treatment, but also to include health care providers other than doc-
tors and nurses who were not initially included in refusal laws. 181
Specifically, pharmacists have asserted their right to conscientiously
object. 182
I" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 2011), § 14; N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAw § 2984(3) (b).
184 IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-13.
185 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,107(a); R.I. GEN. Laws §23-4.11-9(a); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1112(3).
"4 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-507(1) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.1105(1) (b)
(West 2005); Nj. STAT. ANN. § 26:21-1-65(b) (West 1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw
§ 2984(3) (a) (McKinney 2002).
I" 42 C.F.R. § 489.102(a) (1) (2004).
I 88 Id. § 489.102(a) (1) (ii).
189 Id.
It* Id. § 489.102(b)( 1), (2).
191 sonfieltl, supra note 19, at 1.
192 See Pharmacists for Life, supra note 20.
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Some have criticized pharmacists' motivations in asserting this
right, claiming that it is an organized campaign by religious conserva-
tives to encroach on patients' rights to access controversial medical
services.'" On the other hand, pharmacists, like physicians, play an
important and unique role in the health care system.'" Among other
tasks, pharmacists have the role of reviewing the appropriateness of a
patient's drug therapy, intervening when there is a potential problem,
and instructing patients on how to use medications safely and effec-
tively) 95 It follows that, like physicians and nurses, pharmacists should
not be forced to participate in procedures to which they have relig-
ious, moral, or ethical objections.'"
A. Emergency Contraception's Role in the Push for Pharmacist Refusal Laws
Pharmacists' interest in invoking refusal laws has arisen largely in
response to the availability of emergency contraception. In 1998 and
1999, two pharmaceutical products, Preven and Plan B, became avail-
able as products packaged and marketed specifically for use as emer-
gency contraception. 197 The arrival of these drugs thus sparked con-
siderable controversy among pharmacists who objected to prescribing
emergency contraception due to religious, ethical, or moral beliefs) 98
193 See Sonfield, supra note 19, at 1; Paulson, supra note 5, at 1; Stein, supra note 5, at
Al.
194 Freedom of Conscience for Small Pharmacies: Hearing Before the H. Small Bus. Comm.,
109th Cong. app. at 62 (2005), available at lutp://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
useftp.cgi?IPaddress =162.140.64.1288461 en ame =22612.pdf&directo ry = /diskb/wais/
clata/109_house_hearings [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Linda Carrells MacLean,
RPh, CDE, member, American Pharmacists Association); William L. Allen & David B.
Brushwood, Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the Pharmacist's Right of Conscience, 5 J.
PHARMACY & L. 1, 2-6 (1996).
WS Allen & Brushwood, supra note 194, at 2-6.
196 Hearing, supra note 194, app. at 62.
197 AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSN, APIIA SPECIAL REPORT: EMERGENCY CONTRA-
CEPTION: THE PHARMACIST'S ROLE 1, 3 (2000), available at http://www.pharmacist.com/
pdf/erner_contra.pdf thereinafter APHA REPORT]. Emergency contraception consists of
the same hormones as oral contraceptives taken on a daily basis, but are taken in a con-
centrated pill form shortly after unprotected sexual intercourse. Heather Boonstra, Emer-
gency Contraception: Increasing Public Awareness, GUTTMACHER REP'T ON Putt. Poi.'v, Oct.
2002, at 1, 1 available at•http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/05/4/gr050403.pdf. Like
daily oral contraceptives, they have the ability to prevent pregnancy through various
mechanisms, including interfering with ovulation, fertilization, the transport of the fertil-
ized egg to the uterus, or implantation of the blastocyst into the uterus. APIIA REPORT,
supra, at 2.
198 Susan A. Cohen, Objections, Confusion Among Pharmacists Threaten Access to Emergency
Contraception, GUITMACHER REP'T ON PUB. POLY, June 1999, at 1, 1, available at Imp://
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/02/3/gr020301.pdft  Stein, supra note 5, at Al.
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In particular, emergency contraception raised objections from pro-life
pharmacists because they believed that they would be participating in
an abortion procedure by dispensing the drug. 19°
The American Pharmaceutical Association, however, has stated
that emergency contraception does not cause an abortion. 2" Accord-
ing to this view, implantation of the fertilized egg establishes a preg-
nancy. 201 Unlike RU-486, which acts after implantation of the egg into
the uterus, emergency contraception acts before implantation of the
fertilized egg into the uterus, and thus cannot disrupt an established
pregnancy, which is measured by whether the fertilized egg has al-
ready been implanted. 202 It is therefore not an abortifacient. 205
Pro-life groups, however, contend that emergency contraception
does cause an abortion. 204 For example, Pharmacists for Life, a pro-
life association of pharmacists, believes that pregnancy begins with the
fertilization of an egg rather than at the time of implantation. 205 Be-
cause emergency contraception may prevent pregnancy by preventing
the fertilized egg from implanting, this group believes that emergency
contraception terminates an established pregnancy by acting after
fertilization of the egg has occurred. 206 Pharmacists for Life and other
groups also believe that daily oral contraceptives can also act as
chemical abortifacients because those medications can interfere with
processes that occur after fertilization of the egg.207
199 See Cohen, supra note 198, at 1; Bergquist, supra note 26, at 1077-78.
200 APHA REPORT, supra note 197, at 3.
"/ See id.
2Q2 See AP1-1A REPORT, supra note 197, at 3-4; Cohen, supra note 198, at 1-2. Some
pharmacists' objections to dispensing emergency contraception may actually have grown
out of confusion in the media equating emergency contraception and RU-486. See APHA
REPoirr, supra note 197, at 3-4; Cohen, sUpra note 198, at 1-2. For a discussion of the
FDA's approval of RU-486, which is otherwise known as ittifepristone, see generally Lars
Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process? Mifepristone Emlnvils the FDA in Abortion
Politics, 366 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571 (2001).
SeeAPta REPORT, supra note 197, at 3.
214 See Pharmacists for Life Intl, The Pill—How It Works and Fails, http://www.pfli.
org/faq_oc.html (last visited Mar. 24,2006) [hereinafter The Pill).
205 Id.
5°6 ht.
2°7 See API tik REPORT, supra note 197, at 3, 12; The Pill, supra note 204.
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B. Pharmacist Refusal Laws
1. Broad Pharmacist Refusal Laws
The controversy concerning emergency contraception provided
momentum for expanding health care provider refusal laws to in-
clude pharmacists. 208 For example, South Dakota law allows a phar-
macist to refuse to dispense medication that would cause an abortion
or destroy an unborn child. 209 The law defines an unborn child as an
organism existing from fertilization to live birth.21° Under this
definition, any type of oral contraceptive, not merely emergency con-
traception, may qualify as an abortifacient because these medications
may interfere with processes that occur after fertilization.2 "
Arkansas has also recognized that pharmacists may object to
filling prescriptions for any type of contraceptive. 212 Its pharmacist
refusal clause states that nothing prohibits a pharmacist from refusing
to furnish any contraceptive procedures, supplies, or information
Two states enacted even broader legislation, allowing for pharma-
cists' refusal to dispense any medication to which they were morally
opposed. 214 For example, Georgia's State Board of Pharmacy's Code of
Professional Conduct simply declares that a pharmacist who, for moral
reasons, refuses to fill a prescription does not violate professional con-
duct standards. 215 Additionally, Mississippi's broad refusal clause grants
all health care providers, including pharmacists, the right to refuse to
participate in any health care service that violates the health care pro-
vider's conscience. 216
208 See Cohen, supra note 198, at 1; Sonfield, supra note 17, at 7; Stein, supra note 5, at
Al. See generally Donald W. Ilerbe, Note, The Right to Refuse: A Gall for Adequate Protection of a
Pharmacist's Right to Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. &
HEALTH 77 (2002-03) (advocating for expanding refusal laws to include pharmacists to
accommodate their conscientious objections in the context of abortion and emergency
contraception).
208 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36- l 1-70 (2004).
210 Id. § 22-1-2(50A) (2009).
211 SeeAPHA REPORT, supra note 197, at 3,12.
212 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4) (West 2005).
213 Id,
214 See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a), (b), -5(1) (2005); GA. COMP. R. & RECS. 480-
5..03(n) (2001).
215 GA. COMP. R. & RECS. 480-5-.03(n).
210 Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a), (b), -5(1).
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2. Restrictive Pharmacist Refusal Laws
By contrast, Illinois has restricted a pharmacist's right to refuse to
dispense contraception. 217 Under Illinois law, if a contraceptive is in
stock at a pharmacy, the pharmacy must dispense the contraceptive to
a patient without delay. 215 If the contraceptive is not in stock, the
pharmacy must provide a suitable alternative, order the drug, or
transfer the prescription to a local pharmacy of the patient's choice. 2 l°
This law does not mention an individual pharmacist's right to object
ethically, morally, or religiously to dispensing con traceptives. 22° Thus,
in a situation where a pharmacy stocks contraceptive medications, btit
the only pharmacist on duty has a religious, moral, or ethical opposi-
tion to dispensing contraceptives, the pharmacist may have no choice
but to dispense the prescription. 221
Moreover, Illinois's Health Care Right of Conscience Act most
likely does not protect objecting pharmacists. 222 The statute offers
broad protection from liability for health care personnel who refuse
to perform or assist in any way in any health care service that is con-
trary to their conscience. 225 It appears, however, that pharmacists are
not considered "health care personnel" for purposes of the statute. 224
In fact, Republican State Senator Dan Rutherford said that attempts
to include pharmacists in the definition of "health care personnel"
have failed . 225
3. A More Balanced Approach Taken by the American Pharmacists
Association and California
Rather than choosing to give broad rights to either pharmacists
or patients, the American Pharmacists Association (the "APhA") re-
sponded to Illinois's law by taking a more balanced position on a
pharmacist's right to refuse to dispense contraceptives based on
217 ILL. ADMIN. CODF. tit. 68, § 1330.91 (2005); Paulson, supra note 5, at I.
2111 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91.
' 15 Id.
220 See id.
221 See id.
222 See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4 (2002).
229 See id.
224 See id. 70/3(c) (defining "health care personnel" as "any nurse, nurses' aide, medi-
cal school student, professional, paraprofessional or any other person who furnishes, or
assists in the furnishing of, health care service?); see also Chase, supra note 10, at 3 (noting
the lack of statutory protection for conscientiously objecting pharmacists).
225 See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3(c); Chase, supra note 10, at 3.
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moral objections.226 The APhA recognizes a pharmacist's right to ref-
use, but contends that there should also be a system in place to ensure
that the patient's health care needs are served. 227 Among other
things, the APhA suggests that a pharmacy should be staffed such that
if an objecting pharmacist is on call, another pharmacist in the same
pharmacy could dispense the medication. 228 If that is not possible, the
pharmacy could transfer the prescription to a different pharmacy that
will dispense the medication. 229 Additionally, the APhA suggests that
prescribers direct patients to pharmacies that they know will dispense
the medication.23°
Similarly, California allows a pharmacist to refuse to dispense
prescriptions to which he or she is ethically, morally, or religiously op-
posed."' California law requires the pharmacist and pharmacy, how-
ever, to ensure that the patient is able to receive her prescription in a
timely manner. 232 To refuse to dispense a prescription, the pharmacist
must have previously notified his or her employer in writing of the
drugs that he or she objects to dispensing. 233 The pharmacist will then
only be permitted to refuse if the employer can reasonably accommo-
date this refusal without creating undue hardship on the employer. 234
The employer must also establish means to ensure that the patient has
226 Hearing, supra note 194, app. at 61-64.
227 Id. app. at 62.
222 Id.
223 Id.
230 Id.
231 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 733(b) (3) (West Supp. 2006).
252 Id.
2" Id,
234 Id. (noting that "undue hardship" shall have the same meaning as applied to "un-
due hardship" pursuant to subdivision (I) of section 12940 of California's Government
Code). Section 12940 cross-references to the definition of "undue hardship" in Section
12926, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 2005). Subsection (s) of section 12926 defines
"undue hardship" as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered
in light of several factors, including (1) the nature and cost of the accommodation
needed; (2) the overall financial resources of the facilities involved in the provision of the
reasonable accommodations, the number of persons employed at the facility, and the ef-
fect on expenses and resources or the impact otherwise of these accommodations ,upon
the operation of the facility; (3) the overall financial resources of the covered entity, the
overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of employees,
and the number, type, and location of its facilities; (4) the type of operations, including
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the entity; and (5) the geo-
graphic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12926(s) (West 2005).
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timely access to the drug, despite the pharmacist's refusal to dispense
11. 295
IV. LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT LAW AS A MODEL FOR BALANCING
A P•ARMACIST'S RIGHT TO CONSCIENTIOUSLY OBJECT WITH A
WOMAN'S RIGI IT To OBTAIN CONTRACEPTIVES
A. A Failure to Balance Competing Interests in Current
Pharmacist Legislation
A few states have explicitly addressed the issue of a pharmacist's
right to refuse to dispense contraceptives based on religious, moral,
or ethical views. 236 Of those states, Georgia, Mississippi, South Dakota,
and Arkansas fail to protect adequately a woman's fundamental right
to use contraceptives.237 In these states, a pharmacist may flatly refuse
to dispense a prescription for a contraceptive and the pharmacist has
no obligation to assist the woman in filling her prescription. 238
Moreover, there is no requirement that pharmacists or their employ-
ers give notice to women that their prescriptions may not be filled be-
cause of the pharmacists' religious, moral, or ethical beliefs. 239 In
sum, the legislation leaves women with no recourse for filling their
contraceptive prescriptions in a timely manner. 240
The inability to fill contraceptive prescriptions in a timely man-
ner significantly hinders a woman's fundamental right to choose to
access and use contraceptives. 241 Timely access to birth control pre-
295 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 733(1)) (3).
256 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-10-304(4) (West 2005); CAL. Bus. & Paco. CODE
§ 733(b) (3) (West Supp. 2006); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a), (b), -5(1) (2005); S.D.
Conwino LAws § 36-11-70 (2004); GA. Cow,. R. & RF.os. 480-5-.03(n) (2001); ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91 (2005).
239 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4); Miss. Cour. ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a), (b), -5(1);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11.70; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992); Carey v. Population SCIVS. Intl Inc., 431 U.S. 678, 085 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); GA. COMP. R.
& REGS. 480-5-.03(n).
25B See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-107-3(a), (b), -5(1);
S.D. CommEn LAws § 36-11-70; GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-.03(n).
2'9 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4); Mtss. CODE ANN. §§ 4I-107-3(a), (b), -5(1);
S.D. ConnuED LAws § 36-11-70; GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-.03(n).
24° See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 4I-107-3(a), (b), -5(1);
S.D. ConiviEn LAWS § 36-11-70; GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-.03(n).
241 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54; Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. at 485; APnA REPORT, supra note 197, at 4; Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The
Limits of Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergenry Con-
traception?, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2008, 2010 (2004).
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scriptions is essential to women who use contraceptives because the
effectiveness of many contraceptives depends on the ability to take
them within a certain time frame. 242 Timeliness is an especially critical
issue for women seeking to fill a prescription for emergency contra-
ception; the medication is most effective at preventing pregnancy if
taken within seventy-two hours or fewer of unprotected sexual inter-
course. 245
If a woman experiences a delay in receiving emergency contra-
ception because she cannot find a pharmacist who will dispense it, the
time within which she must take the medication may pass, dramati-
cally increasing the chance of pregnancy. 244 For a woman who lives in
an urban area with a multitude of pharmacies within a small radius, or
a woman with the means to travel to another pharmacy, this may be
no more than an inconvenience.245 For low-income women and
women who live in rural areas, however, such a law places a significant
obstacle in the way of exercising the fundamental right to access and
use contraceptives. 246 If the fundamental right to use and access con-
traceptives is to have any meaning, all women who choose to exercise
their right need to be able to fill their contraceptive prescriptions in a
timely manner, so that their choice to exercise this right will not be
rendered ineffective or moot by the passage of time 247
Illinois, on the other hand, has failed to protect adequately the
pharmacist's right to conscientiously object to dispensing such pre-
scriptions by requiring a pharmacy to dispense a contraceptive, with-
out delay, if it is in stock.248 A pharmacist who conscientiously objects
to dispensing contraceptives may be forced to dispense a contracep-
tive if he or she is employed by a pharmacy that stocks contracep-
tives.249 This could happen, for example, if the pharmacy has contra-
ceptives in stock and the pharmacist is the only pharmacist on duty at
242 SeeAPHA REPORT, supra note 197, at 4; Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2010.
2" SeeANIA REPORT, supra note 197, at 4; Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2010.
244 See APHA REPORT, supra note 197, at 4; Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2010.
242 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Griswold,
381 U.S. at 485; Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2010; Cohen, supra note 198, at 2.
242 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Griswold,
381 U.S. at 485; Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2010; Cohen, supra note 198, at 2.
242 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54; Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. at 485-86; Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2010; Cohen, supra note 198,
at 2.
248 See ILL, ADMIN. CODE tit.. 68, § 1330.91 (2005).
249 See id,
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a particular time, or if there is no other willing pharmacist working at
the same time to fill the prescription. 250
B. Model for Balancing Competing Interests in Pharmacist
Refusal Clause Legislation
1. Fundamental Rights May Present Moral Conflict
Life-sustaining treatment court decisions and legislation provide
a model for pharmacist refusal clause legislation because the use of
contraceptives implicates a fundamental liberty interest in the same
way that refusing life-sustaining treatment does. 25 ' The Supreme
Court has recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects both the right to use and access contraceptives
and the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. 252 In its 1992 Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey decision, the Supreme
Court affirmed that the law affords protection to personal decisions
relating to contraception. 255 It noted that personal decisions regard-
ing the use of contraceptives involve choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy.254
Similarly, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the
Court assumed that the liberty interest in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment. 255 The Court also noted that the right
to refuse medical treatment has been recognized by states as a com-
mon-law right to bodily integrity and self-determination, as a constitu-
tionally protected right to privacy within state constitutions, and, in
some cases, as a statutory right. 256 In sum, at their core, both the right
to use and access contraception and the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment speak to an individual's right to self-determination and to
control fundamental decisions involving his or her own body. 257
250 See id.
251 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990); Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86;
Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (D.R.I. 1 988).
222 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278; Crory, 431 U.S. at 685; Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 453; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
253 505 U.S. at 851.
254 Id
255 497 U.S. at 278.
256 Id. at 277-78.
257 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278; Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 453; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 585-86.
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Although both are protected as fundamental rights under the
U.S. Constitution, the refusal of life-sustaining treatment and the use
of contraceptives are also religiously, morally, and ethically controver-
sia1.258 For example, the teachings of the Catholic Church limit health
care providers' ability to allow refusal of life-sustaining treatment and
provide contraceptives. 258 Thus, guided by their own religious convic-
tions, health care providers may oppose both withdrawing or with-
holding life-sustaining treatment and dispensing contraceptives in
certain circumstances. 260 Even if a health care provider is not particu-
larly religious, his or her conscientious objection may be based on
strong ethical or moral beliefs. 261
Thus, a patient's request to withdraw or withhold treatment may
cause religious, moral, or ethical conflict for a health care provider in
the same way that a patient's request for contraceptives does. 262 As a
result, examining the conflict in the life-sustaining treatment context
provides guidance in resolving the conflict between patients seeking
to have their contraceptive prescriptions timely filled and conscien-
tiously objecting pharmacists. 265
2. Proposed Components of Pharmacist Refusal Clause Legislation
Both the transfer and notice requirements embraced by courts
and legislatures allow the patient to exercise his or her right to self-
determination by refusing unwanted medical treatment, without vio-
252 See, e.g., Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 583; Morrison v. Abramovice, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532
(CL App. 1988); Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (CL App. 1986); Milling v.
Super. Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222-23 (Ct. App. 1984); Brophy V. New England Sinai Hosp.,
497 N.E.2d 626, 632 (Mass. 1986); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 437 (N.J. 1987); In re Re-
quena, 517 A.2d 886, 888-89 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), affd, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843
(App. Div. 1989); Delio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (App. Div.
1987); ETHICAL DIRECTIVES, supra note 113, §§ 52, 56-59.
259 See ETHICAL DIRECTIVES, supra note 113, §§ 52, 56-59.
260 See id.
261 see, e.g., Brophy, 997 N.E.2d at 632; Jobes, 529 A.2(1 at 437; Delio, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
262 See, e.g., Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 583; Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 532; Bouvia, 225 Cal.
Rptr. at 304; Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23; Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 632; Jobe.s, 529 A.2d at
437; Requena, 517 A.2d at 888-89; Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 843; Delia, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
265 See, e.g., ALA. Coin § 22-8A-8(a) (LexisNexis 1997); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4736 (West
Supp. 2005); C01.0. REV. STAT. § 15-14507(1), (2) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
580a (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.1105 (West 2005); RV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.633(2), (3) (LexisNexis 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2E1-65 (West 1996); N.Y. Pun.
HEALTH LAW § 2984(3), (4) (McKinney 2002); S.D. COD/PIED LAWS § 34-12D-11 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32.11-108(a) (2001); Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 590-91; Brophy, 497 N.E.2c1
at 639; Requena, 517 A.2d at 870.
20061	 Reproductive Rights & Pharmacists' Conscientious Objections 	 849
lating the religious, moral, or ethical integrity of the objecting health
care provider. 264 A notice requirement gives patients and their fami-
lies advance knowledge of a health care provider's policy regarding
life-sustaining treatment, notifying patients that they cannot rely on
that facility to fulfill their wishes and enabling patients to find another
provider if they so choose.265 A transfer requirement ensures that the
patient's wishes will be carried out in the event the health care pro-
vider refuses the patient's request. 266
Imposing similar duties on pharmacists who conscientiously ob-
ject to filling prescriptions for contraceptives would provide for a
compromise between the two competing interests of the patient and
the objecting pharmacist. 267 A transfer requirement for pharmacists
who conscientiously object to dispensing contraceptives would allow a
pharmacist to maintain his or her ethical integrity while ensuring that
a woman is able to exercise her fundamental right to self-
determination in choosing to use contraceptives. 268 The APhA's testi-
mony to the House Small Business Committee notes that pharmacies
already commonly use such systems in order to accommodate the ob-
jecting pharmacist's beliefs while still allowing the woman to access
con traceptives. 269
2" SPeALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a); CAL. PROB. CODE §4736(b); Cot.o. REV. STAT, § 15.14-
507(1), (2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.1105; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(2); N.Y. Pun.
HEALTH LAW § 2984(3), (4); Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 590-91; Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 639; Jobes,
529 A.2d at 450; Requena, 517 A.2t1 at 870; Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2t1 at 847-48.
265 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-507(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.1105(1) (b); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65(b); N.Y. PUB. HF.Aurn LAW § 2984(3) (a); Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 590-
91; Jobes, 529 A.2d at 450; Requena, 517 A.2d at 870; Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 847-48; 42
C.F.R. §489.102(a)(1), (b)(1), (2) (2004).
266 See, e.g., AIA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a); CAL.. PROB. CODE § 4736()); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-580a; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(2); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-11;
TENN. CODE MN. § 32-11-108(a); Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 591; Brophy, 997 N.E.2d at 639; El-
baum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
267 See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a); CAL. Piton. CODE § 4736; Cow. REV. STAT. § 15-14-
507(1) , (2); CONN. GF,N, STAT. ANN, § 19a-580a; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.1105; Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.633(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2984(3), (4); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D- 1 1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a); Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 590-
91; Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 639; fares, 529 A.2d at 450; Requena, 517 A.2d at 870; Elbaum, 544
N.Y.S.2d at 847-48.
268 See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4736(b); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19a-580a; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(2); S.D. COD/FIED LAWS § 34-12D-11; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a); Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Carey, 931 U.S. at 685; Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 453; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 985; Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 591; Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 639;
Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
269 Hearing, supra note 194, app. at 62.
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For example, a transfer requirement could require the pharma-
cist who objects to dispensing contraceptives to avoid doing so by
transferring the prescription to another pharmacist within the same
pharmacy who does not object to dispensing contraceptives. 270 To fa-
cilitate this process and ensure access to contraceptives that must be
taken within a few days of being prescribed, pharmacies would be re-
quired to have on staff at all times a pharmacist willing to dispense
contraceptives. 271 If however, this is not possible because there are no
other pharmacists within the pharmacy willing to dispense contracep-
tives, the pharmacist would then be required to transfer the cus-
tomer's prescription to a different pharmacy that is willing to dis-
pense contraceptives.272
A requirement that pharmacies have at least one pharmacist on
staff at all times willing to dispense contraceptives may be especially
important in rural areas where there may be no pharmacy within a
short distanCe.273 Emergency contraception, in particular, must be
taken within seventy-two hours to be most effective in preventing
pregnancy.274 If transferring to another pharmacy would result in a
delay of more than seventy-two hours before the patient could take
the medication, the medication would become ineffective in prevent-
ing pregn an cy.275
Pharmacists and pharmacies conscientiously objecting to dispens-
ing contraceptives should also be required to notify their customers of
their policy so that customers will not mistakenly rely on a pharma-
cist's or pharmacy's willingness to dispense contraceptives. 276 A
notification requirement would require an individual pharmacist who
conscientiously objects to dispensing contraceptives to inform his or
her employer of such objections before he or she is permitted to ref-
use to fill any prescriptions.277 This would enable the employer to de-
2" See id.
271 See id.
272 See id; Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2011; Cohen, supra note 198, at 2-3.
272 See Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2010-11; Cohen, supra note 198, at 2-3.
APHA REFoRT, supra note 197, at 12; Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2010;
Cohen, supra note 198, at 2.
272 See APHA REPORT, supra note 197, at 12; Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2010;
Cohen, supra note 198, at 2.
276 See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-14-507(1) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.1105(1) (b)
(West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:21-1-65(b) (West 1996); N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW
§ 2984(3) (a), (4) (McKinney 2002); Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 590-91; jobes, 529 A.2d at 450;
Requena, 517 A.2d at 870; Elbaurn, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 847-48; 42 C.F.R. § 489.102(a) (1),
(b) (1), (2) (2004).
277 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODY: § 733(b) (3) (West 2006).
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velop a system so that the pharmacist's objection could be accommo-
dated without burdening any customers. 278 For example, California
requires the pharmacist to notify his or her employer, in writing, of
the drugs that he or she objects to dispensing, before the pharmacist
is permitted to conscientiously refuse to dispense these drugs. 279 The
pharmacy must then establish alternate means to ensure that the cus-
tomer receives her prescriptions in a timely manner. 289
Additionally, a notice requirement as applied to pharmacies
would require pharmacies that choose not to stock contraceptives to
notify potential customers by displaying a sign that clearly indicates
that they do not provide contraceptives. 281 With such notification, cus-
tomers would know prior to filling certain prescriptions that they
cannot rely on this particular pharmacy.282 Thus, they would be able
to find an alternate pharmacy before they need the particular medi-
cation, avoiding a conflict with that pharmacy, and balancing their
rights against those of the pharmacy. 283
CONCLUSION
Refusal clauses were first enacted to ensure health care providers
would not be forced to perform certain reproductive services, such as
abortion, to which they were religiously, morally, or ethically opposed.
Several factors, such as the growth of religious health care organiza-
tions and managed care, as well as the development of controversial
medical technology, have led states to expand health care provider
refusal laws. In particular, pharmacists, who are not protected under
278 See id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 See Cantor & Baum, supm note 241, at 2011. In March 2006, Wal-Mart, which up un-
til that point was the last large pharmacy chain to decline to carry emergency contracep-
tion, announced that it will begin to stock the Plan B contraceptive in its pharmacies. See.
Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart to Carry Plan II Emergency Contraception (Mac 3,
2006), available at http://www.walmartfacts.com/articles/1704.aspx.
282 See Com. RE.v. STAT. § 15-14-507(1) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. §765.1105(1)(b)
(West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65(b) (West 1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2984(3)(a) (McKinney 2002); Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 590-91; lobes, 529 A.2d at 450; Re-
quena, 517 A.2d at 870; Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 847-48; 42 C.F.R. § 489.102(a) (1), (b) (I ),
(2) (2004); Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2011.
288 See Cow. REV. STAT. § 15-14-507(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765,1105(1)(b); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 26:21-I-65(b); N.Y. Pus. FIFALTH § 2984(3)(a); Gray, 697 F. Stipp. at 590-91; Jobe.%
529 A.2d at 450; Requena, 517 A.2d at 870; Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2c1 at 847-48; 42 C.F.R.
§ 489.102(a) (1), (b) (1), (2); Cantor & Baum, supra note 241, at 2011.
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most abortion and contraception refusal clauses, have pushed for a
right to conscientiously object to dispensing contraception.
A few states have explicitly addressed a pharmacist's right to con-
scientiously object. Most of this current legislation, however, fails to
balance adequately a pharmacist's right to conscientiously object
against a woman's right to access contraceptives. Court decisions and
legislation addressing a similar conflict between health care providers
and patients' refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment provide guid-
ance for future pharmacist refusal laws. The transfer and notice re-
quirements imposed on conscientiously objecting health care providers
in the life-sustaining treatment context should likewise be imposed on
pharmacists who conscientiously object to dispensing contraceptives.
This approach best balances the rights of both pharmacist and patient.
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